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The Monterrey Conference on Financing for Development in 2002 brought leaders and senior 
ofﬁ  cials from Governments and international organizations, senior ﬁ  nancial sector executives and 
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provided a forum at which participants talked to each other in informal roundtables, as well 
as made public speeches. Commitments were made to increase development assistance and to 
improve global as well as national governance. This paper examines how this unique event came 
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Barry Herman
“It happened in Monterey…in old Mexico”1
The United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development (FfD), held in Monterrey, 
Mexico, in March 2002 was unprecedented. It brought together key economic and political decision mak-
ers, including more than 50 heads of State and Government, over 200 ministers of ﬁ  nance, foreign affairs, 
development and trade. They were joined by the heads of the United Nations (UN), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO), and by the chairs of the 
major intergovernmental committees that deal with international ﬁ  nancial issues, including the Financial 
Stability Forum (whose chair was also President of the Bank for International Settlements), the Group of 
10 (the major developed countries in monetary and ﬁ  nancial affairs), the Group of 20 (8 major developed 
countries and the “systemically important” developing countries that were invited to join them) and the 
Group of 24 (the caucus of developing countries at the Bretton Woods institutions (BWIs). 
The heads of the major regional development banks and other development ﬁ  nance organizations 
or their representatives also participated, as did all the relevant United Nations specialized agencies, funds 
and programmes. They were joined by prominent individuals from the world of business and ﬁ  nance and 
by a range of civil society leaders, including Jimmy Carter, a former President of the United States of 
America. In short, this was one of the largest and most diverse gatherings of ofﬁ  cials and other stakehold-
ers ever to have met at such a senior level on international ﬁ  nancial matters.2
Since the end of the Second World War, international decisions on monetary, ﬁ  nancial, trade and 
development matters have been made in multilateral forums, albeit those limited to a few countries or a 
restricted range of issues, and very often behind closed doors. The Monterrey process invited all coun-
tries to consider all the issues together, in public and with non-governmental stakeholders participating. It 
turned out to be the right mechanism at the right moment.
As will be described here, however, it required ﬁ  ve years to build sufﬁ  cient conﬁ  dence among the 
relevant decision-makers for them to agree to participate in the new process at Monterrey. Even then, real-
world events helped propel them beyond their standard forums and processes. When the “9/11” tragedy 
raised the urgency of making an effective global political effort for development, the gathering momen-
tum and interest in the Monterrey process of Governments, international institutions, private sector and 
civil society organizations provided a compelling opportunity. 
Diplomats at the UN had successfully paved the way by developing a new modality of informal 
international discussions for consensus-building and by securing its acceptance as the approach to use in 
preparing the Monterrey process. The UN has sometimes been accused of being a comparatively rigid and 
stale intergovernmental forum, discouraging initiative and goodwill; but it can also be a ﬂ  exible tool for 
1  Lyrics by Billy Rose, 1930; recorded by Frank Sinatra in 1955.
2  For details on participants, see UN (2002b: 19-22). See UN (2002a) for speeches, press conferences and relevant 
documentation.2  DESA Working Paper No. 23
international convergence when the situation warrants it and enough actors recognize it. This is what hap-
pened in “FfD”. 
As this paper will seek to demonstrate, Monterrey was a departure from the norm in several 
ways. First, the Conference had been the initiative of developing countries, whose main message to the 
developed countries was something like, “this time we can reach a deal to do better”. Over time, they 
convinced sceptical Governments of developed countries, not to mention the leadership of some major 
international institutions, to take a chance on the UN. This was central. 
The FfD preparatory process was also unusual in that the standard UN negotiating practices on 
economic and social affairs were held in abeyance through most of the Monterrey preparations. Moreover, 
while civil society organizations that advocate on ﬁ  nancial issues usually avoid the UN, considering it ir-
relevant for their issues, several of them decided to engage in New York and enriched the process. So, too, 
did a number of professionals involved in international ﬁ  nance for emerging economies and private-sector 
organizations that saw something special happening at the UN. As regards both sets of non-governmental 
stakeholders, forms of engagement with governmental representatives such as “hearings” were tried out 
that were simply not available in any other international ﬁ  nancial and trade forum. 
Over four years have passed since Monterrey and, as the paper will also argue, the future of the 
process has become uncertain. The “Monterrey Consensus” adopted at the Conference remains an ef-
fective point of reference in the BWIs and in donor government forums, where ﬁ  nance and development 
assistance ministries meet and make policy. However, in the UN bodies responsible for the follow-up to 
Monterrey, the sense of mission and political innovation that characterized the FfD process has weakened 
somewhat. Yet, FfD can still have a future as the unique process that it was. It requires, as the paper con-
cludes, a new concurrence of the factors that were responsible for its initial success.
What Monterrey delivered in policy reform
The central feature of the Monterrey process was that it dared to reach for agreement with political com-
mitment—not just a formal text—on a new North-South understanding on what UN delegates refer to 
as the “hard” issues of international trade, monetary, ﬁ  nancial and development policy. All through the 
1990s, the UN had mostly been a forum for agreement on the “soft” issues, such as the rights of children, 
social development, gender equality, population policy and environmental sustainability, albeit often only 
at the level of principles and broad intentions rather than concrete actions. In 2000, some of these inten-
tions were brought together and codiﬁ  ed into speciﬁ  c targets to be achieved by 2015 in the United Nations 
Millennium Declaration (adopted as General Assembly resolution 55/2), following an unprecedented 
gathering of heads of State and Government in New York at the Millennium Summit. However, even this 
kind of political event was less ambitious than what FfD had proposed, i.e., turning the UN into a serious 
political forum on ﬁ  nancial and other economic matters.
Some argue that the Monterrey Consensus never delivered the concrete advances promised on 
ﬁ  nancing for development. However, certain real political commitments were made at Monterrey, if not 
necessarily as many or as deep as some observers might have wished. Also, not all of these commitments 
have led to signiﬁ  cant actual changes in policy. After all, Monterrey did not and could not overturn actual 
economic power relations. However, it did forge effective alliances that increased opportunities for some 
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The reform that has received the most attention is the reversal of the decade-long decline in ofﬁ  -
cial development assistance (ODA). The Millennium Declaration had been a grand commitment, but there 
was little money behind it. One of the contentious points in the negotiations of the Monterrey Consensus 
was what to say about increasing aid. In the end, a fairly non-committal text was adopted: “We recognize 
that a substantial increase in ODA and other resources will be required….” A separate paragraph referred 
to the UN target for donor Governments to give ODA equivalent to 0.7 per cent of their gross national 
product (GNP) (UN, 2002b: 9), which was more than three times the actual ﬁ  gure in 2001 (0.22 per cent). 
In fact, no stronger consensus text was possible. Nevertheless, overall ODA measured in constant prices 
and exchange rates has risen 18 per cent from 2001 to 2004 (the latest year for which data are currently 
available), for an average increase of just over 5 per cent a year. However, the rate of growth of ODA has 
to double in 2005 and 2006 to reach projections based on aid commitments for the latter years (OECD, 
2006:17). 
Several individual commitments to raise ODA were made in 2002 in the context of the Monterrey 
Conference (for a country-by-country listing, see UN 2003a, table 3). In the case of the United States and 
the European Union (EU), there almost seemed to be a “pledging competition” in early 2002, as the ﬁ  rst 
announcement by the US President was followed later by an explanation that in effect raised the pledged 
amount when it seemed small next to the EU commitment at its Barcelona meeting. It should be noted 
that, in both Europe and the US, civil society advocates had been pressing for the aid increases and should 
receive a signiﬁ  cant amount of the credit for realizing them. On the other hand, translating the commit-
ments into cash in each case requires continued pressure on national Governments, and far more resources 
are needed than have been pledged thus far.3 Indeed, additional commitments were made in 2005 in the 
run up to the UN World Summit in September and, if they are realized, ODA will rise by almost $50 bil-
lion and be at a level of about 0.36 per cent of GNP in 2010 (OECD, 2006: 16).
In this context, the agreement in the Consensus on “staying engaged” for an effective follow-up 
contained an interesting feature in that it explicitly recognized the need for a “global information cam-
paign” to continue to press countries to help reach the Millennium Development Goals (UN, 2002b: 17). 
This effort has been implemented through the MDG Campaign Unit of the United Nations Development 
Programme. “Staying engaged” also gave a fresh impetus to reform of the UN intergovernmental machin-
ery, in particular as it concerned the Economic and Financial Committee (Second Committee) of the Gen-
eral Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). Governments had decided in Monterrey 
that the follow-up should be undertaken using the existing intergovernmental machinery, which could mean 
duplicating some of the existing work in these bodies or consolidating different efforts under FfD. Thus far, 
however, there has been little consolidation of Secretariat reporting or of intergovernmental discussion.4
3  Following Monterrey, donor Governments also agreed in Rome in 2003 and in subsequent meetings to strengthen 
the effectiveness of aid, including by reducing its transaction cost. Something as routine as reducing paperwork 
might not seem a development policy victory, but donor Governments have heretofore jealously guarded their 
paperwork prerogatives (see IMF and World Bank, 2004: 11.7-11.14).
4  For many years, the Assembly has annually adopted separate resolutions on North-South aspects of international 
trade, commodities, external debt and ﬁ  nancial architecture reform, which typically have a considerable overlap. 
In 2002, delegations in the Second Committee negotiating the ﬁ  rst substantive FfD follow-up resolution agreed 
to take selected texts from the four other resolutions (General Assembly resolutions 57/235, 57/236, 57/240 
and 57/241) into the FfD resolution (General Assembly resolution 57/272) to ensure consistency at least as far 
as speciﬁ  c wording was concerned on the selected paragraphs. In 2003, the FfD resolution dealt primarily with 
organizational issues (General Assembly resolution 58/230) and the four other resolutions were negotiated as 
before (General Assembly resolutions 58/197, 58/202, 58/203 and 58/304). Multiple resolutions were again 
adopted in 2004 and 2005.4  DESA Working Paper No. 23
The Monterrey process also sought to reform intergovernmental processes outside the UN, with 
the aim of making them more democratic. Here, as in the case of aid noted above, the text adopted in the 
Monterrey Consensus looks weak. The relevant paragraph pertaining to the major institutions and forums 
began, “A ﬁ  rst priority is to ﬁ  nd pragmatic and innovative ways to further enhance the effective partici-
pation of developing countries and countries with economies in transition in international dialogues and 
decision-making processes.” Subsequent sentences then addressed speciﬁ  c institutions and bodies, more 
or less following the model of the one addressed to IMF and the World Bank, namely “to continue to 
enhance participation of all developing countries and countries with economies in transition in their deci-
sion-making.…” (UN, 2002b: 14). 
The commitment to address the issue embodied consensus recognition that there was a problem 
in institutional governance. However, the consensus did not extend to how to ﬁ  x it. On the plus side, the 
governance issue entered the agenda of the Development Committee the September following the Monter-
rey meeting and, eventually, the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC). The Commit-
tees are forums of ministerial-level governors of IMF and the World Bank and they set both institutions 
into active motion on the issue. As might have been expected, only marginal improvements have so far 
been agreed to, for example attending to the need to strengthen the overwhelmed ofﬁ  ces of the Executive 
Directors for sub-Saharan Africa through “capacity-building” assistance.5 
The IMFC acknowledged the deep political importance of the issue to IMF in its 24 April 2004 
communiqué, which states: “The IMF’s effectiveness and enhanced credibility as a cooperative institution 
also depends on all members having appropriate voice and representation. Efforts should continue to be 
made to enhance the capacity of developing and transition countries to participate more effectively in IMF 
decision-making....” (IMF, 2004: para. 18). 
The central obstacle to addressing the problem is that a few small developed countries have to 
move aside to let large developing countries take their seats on the Executive Boards of the institutions so 
as to better reﬂ  ect international economic realities. In addition, it is difﬁ  cult any longer to justify the in-
formal arrangements by which a European is always elected Managing Director of IMF and a US national 
always heads the World Bank. Monterrey, as an intergovernmental initiative led by developing countries, 
raised the visibility of the governance issues of representation and transparency and, while that did not 
solve the problems, it did help put them into play politically. 
Monterrey also provided an opportunity to give further political impetus to international coopera-
tion on some of the donor-advocated domestic policies, such as better confronting corruption. In this case, 
the genuine interest expressed by civil society, business and governmental representatives in Monterrey 
could only have helped speed the successful conclusion of negotiations that had already started on a treaty 
to combat corruption. The United Nations Convention Against Corruption was agreed to on schedule and 
has now entered into force. It criminalizes a number of corrupt practices, adds protections for “whistle 
blowers”, establishes rules for freezing illicit assets and otherwise strengthens cooperation between 
States. It makes it more difﬁ  cult to hide illicit gains and helps developing countries recover their stolen as-
sets (UN, 2003c). The proof will, of course, be in the implementation, but the quick launch and the broad 
support at high levels can only be encouraging.
5  In each institution, two Executive Directors represent all of sub-Saharan Africa, around 45 countries in each case. 
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Again, what Monterrey provided was an opportunity for policy reform that may or may not be 
fully captured. For example, the Consensus called on the WTO “to ensure that any consultation is rep-
resentative of its full membership…” (UN, 2002b: 14). One of the difﬁ  culties that emerged at the WTO 
Cancún Ministerial Meeting in September 2003 was that developing countries were seriously disappoint-
ed in how few of their views were reﬂ  ected in post-consultation negotiation texts. This frustration seems 
to have been an impetus to the “galvanizing of developing countries into issue-based coalitions [which] 
has led to conclusions about their latent empowerment, and also to concerns about North-South polariza-
tion” (UN, 2003b: 6). Nevertheless, developed countries in WTO are hearing more clearly the concerns 
and voices of developing countries in the give and take of negotiations. This is not to say that the ﬁ  nal 
negotiated outcome will make the “Doha Agenda” into a true “Development Round”, but there is today 
more serious engagement by developed country trade policy negotiators on developing country concerns.
In short, Monterrey gave political credibility to some of the global governance demands of 
developing countries, while also providing a forum in which Governments of developed countries could 
respond to public pressure at home by collectively committing to enhance development cooperation. 
Developed countries also extracted pledges from developing country Governments to handle their own de-
velopment requirements more effectively. These commitments by developing countries in embracing the 
Consensus provided leverage that the multilateral institutions could use to press the donor Governments 
for additional aid funds and that the donor Governments, in turn, could take to their legislatures. 
How the Monterrey process evolved
If, in March 2002, the Monterrey Conference became an important political forum on international 
ﬁ  nancial issues, few would have believed it possible when the process began in 1997.6 Unlike some other 
UN conferences that began with the intention of holding a global summit, Governments did not have 
any agreed vision of what they were aiming for. Certainly, few delegates seriously expected that it would 
become a summit meeting and several expected it would collapse, as had a number of failed initiatives in 
the 1970s and 1980s to launch a round of “global negotiations” on development at the UN. Indeed, FfD 
succeeded because it began as a vague notion and opportunistically evolved over time into an increasingly 
precise project. 
The starting point for understanding the history of FfD is seeing it against the background of a 
general ineffectiveness of the UN General Assembly and Economic and Social Council as global policy-
making institutions. As there is no global “government”, there is no obligation for the more powerful 
countries to share decision-making with the weaker ones, except on those occasions when the cooperation 
of the latter is essential for the decisions to have effect. In those cases, the richer countries may offer to 
take up an issue through the UN, and the quid pro quo is that the poor participate with them in making the 
decisions. Monterrey was a case in point.
In FfD, an additional problem was that delegations to UN bodies are normally drawn from foreign 
ministries, which have little responsibility for international ﬁ  nancial matters (except for development 
assistance in a number of donor countries). As foreign ministries were unlikely to be given responsibility 
over the content of FfD, they would have to build new working relationships in their capitals with their 
6  The account in this section draws, inter alia, on Herman (2002, 2003). A chronology of the FfD process from 1997 
to 2005 may be found on the FfD web page at www.un.org/esa/ffd/chronologyffdprocess97-03.htm.6  DESA Working Paper No. 23
colleagues in ﬁ  nance.7 In many cases, this was no small undertaking. In the past, foreign ministers may 
have had primacy in the cabinets of Government leaders, but in the globalizing 1990s, ﬁ  nance ministers 
were usually the most senior ministers. Furthermore, diplomacy at the UN was generally not regarded as 
the most important, except with respect to Security Council issues. 
The UN does undertake a number of development assistance activities and is a forum in which 
political commitments on aid can be made, such as the famous aid target of 0.7 per cent of GNP. However, 
when the donor Governments want to make a joint policy decision they mostly do so in their own forum, 
the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD/DAC), or in the World Bank or the Development Committee, where developed countries control a 
clear majority of votes (if votes ever need to be cast). By the same token, international ﬁ  nancial policy de-
cisions are reached in the IMF, where developed countries also control the decisions; in developed coun-
try forums, such as the Paris Club for deciding on developing country relief from obligations to ofﬁ  cial 
government creditors; or in specialized ﬁ  nancial institutions like the Bank for International Settlements or 
the regulatory oversight committees that it services. An even more limited forum largely guides coherence 
in all these ﬁ  nancial areas, namely, the ﬁ  nance ministers of the Group of 8 major industrialized countries.
And yet, the UN has always held an attraction to Governments as the world’s main political 
forum. The General Assembly is the place that most heads of State and Government want to address, not 
the Annual Meetings of IMF and the World Bank. Indeed, the heads of IMF and the World Bank have 
addressed ECOSOC annually since its early years. This is a relatively safe venue in that ECOSOC is a 
coordinating body and not a potential instruction-giving body. The General Assembly is in theory the 
senior intergovernmental deliberative and normative body and potentially could interfere in decisions of 
the Fund and the Bank, except that agreements had been signed in the early years of the Organization 
stipulating that the United Nations would not interfere in the policy work at either BWI (or WTO and its 
predecessor, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade). 
So, the central challenge that UN delegates had to face in FfD was to bring the ﬁ  nance ministries 
and other relevant ofﬁ  cials into a UN process and engage the institutions they oversee in a serious way. 
More than just serve as a place to make a speech, Monterrey did just that. The ofﬁ  cial sessions in Mon-
terrey comprised typical opportunities for set speeches by leaders or ministers in the plenary, while the 
President of Mexico also hosted a private, leaders-only meeting. More interestingly, however, several days 
were devoted to informal roundtable discussions, ﬁ  rst at the ministerial level and then including heads of 
State and Government. The roundtables focused on building bridges among institutions and stakeholders, 
including seriously listening to non-governmental points of view presented by business leaders and articu-
late speakers from non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
The Monterrey Conference was also notable for its not having to go through contentious negotia-
tions of formal texts that typically absorb much of the energy at large UN conferences. The negotiations 
had already been completed two months before in New York at the ﬁ  nal preparatory meeting. Indeed, 
more than the summit conference itself, the real revolution was in the ﬁ  nal meeting of the Preparatory 
7  International trade policy was added after some years to the FfD agenda, which was initially mainly focused 
on ﬁ  nancial issues per se. The same problem of jurisdiction arose here, even though in many countries, foreign 
ministries are responsible for trade negotiations and UN diplomats sometimes have had trade-negotiation postings. 
That is, there seems to have been as little interaction between the UN and trade policy departments in the foreign 
ministries that were responsible for both as there was when the portfolios were held by separate ministries, thus 
fully echoing the mandate issue vis-à-vis ﬁ  nance ministries.The Politics of Inclusion in the Monterrey Process  7
Committee in January 2002, as many Governments sent ﬁ  nance ministry ofﬁ  cials from capitals and the 
ofﬁ  ces of Executive Directors at the BWIs to work alongside their UN Mission staff in negotiating the 
ﬁ  nal text of the Monterrey Consensus. 
A different approach to UN diplomacy
From its beginnings, and continuing until Monterrey itself, FfD has had detractors as well as supporters 
among UN Missions and even in different parts of the UN Secretariat. It held out a promise of creating 
a new form of North-South cooperation for development, although it was unclear that it could deliver 
anything at all. The doubters mostly saw it as selling out the unrealized ideals of an independent South to 
a dominating North. 
From that point of view, confrontation was the better approach, steadily challenging the North and 
the institutions it dominated. Cooperation meant co-optation. Country by country, the South was funda-
mentally weak, but at least its concerns could be kept before the world through disciplined negotiation on 
texts put forward by the Group of 77 (G-77), the developing countries caucus at the UN on economic and 
social affairs. The proper role of the Secretariat, in the view of the more radical developing countries, was 
to give the South arguments to use in its collective confrontation with the North, whether in New York, 
Geneva or Washington. FfD, with its emphasis on inclusion and cooperation represented a major threat to 
this approach. It would disrupt the way the G-77 had always worked without delivering anything really 
new in return.
Most UN Missions had a different point of view. They saw the traditional approach to UN ne-
gotiations on economic issues as emphasizing the weakness of the South and leading nowhere. The only 
power of the G-77 was over words on texts that did not matter, and even that was highly limited. In the 
classical UN consideration of an economic policy issue, the G-77 ﬁ  rst negotiates a text among its own 
members and then presents it to the developed countries. The representatives of the latter ﬁ  nd it unaccept-
able and the North (usually led by the EU) and the South (G-77) then negotiate towards a watered-down 
version of the G-77 proposal. Nothing in the real world changes as a result.8 That is obviously not how 
policy change happens. 
In fact, the seed of FfD had actually been sown in one of the most unpromising of these North-
South negotiations, one that had dragged on for more than four years and was ﬁ  nally coming to a close in 
1997, mainly so that delegations could adopt it and allow it to die a peaceful death. This was the “Agenda 
for Development”, 287 paragraphs ﬁ  lling over 100 pages with platitudes and bland statements of prin-
ciple on development policy, plus hortatory statements about reform of the UN bodies and the Secretariat. 
However, one section contained an opportunity to establish a dialogue between the intergovernmental 
processes of the BWIs and ECOSOC, and the prescient ﬁ  nal paragraph of the Agenda stated, “Due con-
8  The negotiators are often junior-level diplomats, functioning without clear instructions from senior national 
ofﬁ  cials that would allow a substantive give and take. Without authority to commit their Governments, the 
negotiation is instead about ﬁ  nding words that will make it look like some policy change is advanced but which 
actually does not commit anyone to much. Indeed, the exercise usually leads to a reiteration of “agreed language” 
from another political process where policies are actually made, or from a previous year’s consideration of the 
item.8  DESA Working Paper No. 23
sideration should be given to modalities for conducting an intergovernmental dialogue on the ﬁ  nancing of 
development.…” (UN, 1997: 108).9 
Venezuela’s representative at the time had introduced that last sentence into the negotiations at 
virtually the last minute. Apparently, it was accepted because it was only an agreement to think about 
doing something, not actually do it. A few months later, in the fall of 1997, then the chairman of the UN 
Economic and Financial (Second) Committee, he interested ﬁ  rst a number of Latin American and then 
Asian and African countries in pursuing the idea further. It thus became a proposal of the G-77. It seemed 
headed for defeat, as had similar proposals over the past 20 years, until in November the United States an-
nounced its support for the initiative. That gave it the momentum to bring in the other countries, including 
the somewhat reluctant EU.
Agreement was possible, in part, because the resolution embodying the proposal was intentionally 
non-committal. As adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 1997, it called for a “high-level 
international intergovernmental consideration of ﬁ  nancing for development” (General Assembly resolu-
tion 52/179). That could mean anything from a summit conference to a seminar of senior ofﬁ  cials. The 
resolution also asked the Assembly to reconvene its Second Committee in March 1998 to consider what 
information needed to be collected to decide what type of event to organize, and it called for an ad hoc 
working group of the Assembly (a committee of the whole) to be formed in 1999 to draw up a speciﬁ  c 
proposal. This gave the proponents of FfD two years to build consensus around the “form, scope and 
agenda” of the proposed event. The initial resolution thus reﬂ  ected both that there was no consensus at 
the end of 1997 that any such meeting at a senior level was warranted, and that no one was insisting on 
permanently ruling it out. 
Meanwhile, the proposal for a joint meeting of senior Government representatives from the 
Bretton Woods committees and ECOSOC was quietly percolating through intersecretariat channels, and 
although nothing had been decided before the end of 1997, it was becoming increasingly clear that some 
meeting would take place, and it did in April 1998. The prospects for that meeting might have been helped 
by the very positive tone set at the special Second Committee meeting in March to follow up on the FfD 
proposal. The US Ambassador gave his Government’s statement; it may well have been the ﬁ  rst time the 
US Permanent Representative ever addressed this Committee.10 Many other Governments also sent their 
permanent representatives to give their statements, together signalling that something unusual and impor-
tant was happening. 
The US Ambassador indicated strong interest of the US Government in the new FfD process, 
but cautioned that it would not countenance a new Bretton Woods conference to restructure the IMF 
  9  In fact, the General Assembly had proposed in May 1996 to invite the BWIs and members of their ministerial 
oversight committees (the Interim Committee, which would later become the IMFC, and the Development 
Committee) to meet with ECOSOC (General Assembly resolution 50/227, para. 88) and the Council responded 
to the Assembly proposal in July when, inter alia, it requested the Secretary-General to consult the institutions 
by early 1997 on the possibility of organizing such a meeting (Economic and Social Council resolution 1996/43, 
para. 5). The intention at that time was to strengthen collaboration of the institutions in light of the global UN 
conferences in the 1990s, including on environmental, social, gender, population, food and habitat issues, as well 
as on the needs of special groups of developing countries), rather than address the institutions’ own “bread and 
butter” issues of ﬁ  nancing for development, which came later.
10  Usually, the countries with large UN Missions, like the US, would send ambassadors with the rank of Deputy 
Permanent Representative to meetings on economic and social issues when they warranted a higher level of 
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and World Bank. In other words, and as others echoed, there were things to discuss in an FfD event, but 
on condition that the initiative would be practical and that the developing countries would not push for 
unrealizable commitments. There would be some interesting negotiations over the next few years on what 
to consider “unrealizable”, but the essential point is that the process began right away to take on a positive 
momentum.
Furthermore, the genius in drafting the initial FfD resolution was maintained as the governing 
prescription all the way to Monterrey: commit to formal negotiation the fewest words possible and do not 
press to include text on which there is no real agreement. In other words, a strategy evolved in the FfD 
process to hold off any negotiations on texts for as long as possible, and then negotiations should be about 
nuance and appropriate phrasing of essentially agreed points. Moreover, instead of the standard G-77 ini-
tiation of negotiations, all texts were tabled either by co-chairs of committees or by “facilitators” that they 
appointed, the latter being trusted and weathered diplomats, whose job it was to take into account differ-
ent views, produce their own “compromise” text and then separately absorb the criticism of their text from 
all sides as they iterated towards a consensus.
The idea was that the substantive points should be argued out, not in text negotiations but in in-
formal dialogues and, indeed, in open discussion involving “all relevant stakeholders”, a term that would 
become an essential aspect of the FfD process. These stakeholders include, in particular, relevant govern-
ment representatives and international institutions, business and civil society. Agreements, when they 
could be reached, would be among government representatives—the UN is an intergovernmental forum, 
after all—but non-voting participants were welcomed to seek to inﬂ  uence the consensus-building process 
through dialogue.
The open and informal approach allowed the participants to hear and weigh a broad range of 
views, as the restrictions on permitted speakers in a formal meeting of a General Assembly committee 
could be waived in an informal session. The informal structure also allowed a frank give and take, as no 
ofﬁ  cial records were kept of what each speaker said (the co-chairs, typically one ambassador from the 
North and one from the South, would instead produce balanced summaries of the discussion, assisted by 
the Secretariat). In this way, a sense of participation among the different stakeholders grew. That broad 
participation would be followed, if slowly, by a measure of ownership, which would make it easier to pass 
through the difﬁ  cult moments, of which there would be many. 
In the end, the process worked. The developing countries did not press for rhetorical victories but 
sought practical actions from their “partners”. Developed countries promised to deliver on some policies, 
like aid, and agreed to make Monterrey a North-South summit. All sides also welcomed proposals from 
the private sector and civil society, as long as they held out realistic promise. The leading political themes 
of the FfD process quickly became and remain pragmatism and ownership. Pragmatism characterized 
the entire FfD process, sometimes to the frustration of some NGOs and government representatives, but 
it held together the relevant stakeholders and produced the Monterrey Conference and the “Monterrey 
process”. As noted earlier, the texts so negotiated were typically bland, but in some cases they had politi-
cal commitment behind them. In other cases, discussions in international gatherings had ended without a 
strong consensus and without a strong text. People understood that the words on the page were not what 
mattered, but the actions that might, and would, follow.10  DESA Working Paper No. 23
Engaging stakeholders in the new UN process
The initial Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly in 1999 did not manage to 
deliver the agenda as had been requested, but it set the stage by instituting the FfD informal meetings’ 
strategy, arranging for business and civil society inputs in panel presentations to meetings of delegates, 
bringing senior ofﬁ  cials from the BWIs into the meetings, preventing the tabling of any premature draft 
texts by the G-77 and otherwise keeping doubters about the process from undermining it. After the Work-
ing Group had completed its task in June 1999, there was enough conﬁ  dence for the Assembly to agree to 
go to the next step and convoke a formal Preparatory Committee for the FfD “event”. It was not agreed at 
the time that the event would be a summit-level conference; nor was it agreed where or when it would be 
held or what the agenda would contain. However, there was a sense that something important could come 
out of the process based on how the discussions had been evolving. 
Thus, in early 2000, the “PrepCom” began its work. It was another committee of the whole, but 
with an innovative 15-member bureau and again co-chairs at the ambassadorial level from the North and 
South. The Bureau would guide the work of the PrepCom and seek to engage the institutional and non-
governmental stakeholders in the FfD meetings process. 
In June 2000, the PrepCom reached a crucial milestone when it adopted an agenda for the Confer-
ence. The developed countries had pressed for emphasis on domestic policy issues in developing coun-
tries, including domestic good governance. Developing countries pressed for international policy commit-
ments, including global governance; this was seen as dangerous by most developed countries, since their 
dominance of decision-making in the international ﬁ  nancial and trading “architecture” could be chal-
lenged. The US ﬁ  nally agreed to include “systemic issues” on the agenda when it was offered an “escape 
clause”, which allowed for reconsideration of including that item on the agenda if the US saw its national 
interest being threatened. The European Union then found itself isolated and hard pressed not to accept a 
deal to which the United States had agreed. 
Besides, by then the World Bank and IMF had been brought inside the secretariat team that was 
servicing the process, along with other parts of the UN system. That, in itself, constituted a conﬁ  dence-
building measure for the developed countries. The World Bank made a major commitment to support the 
FfD process, including seconding a staff member to the FfD Coordinating Secretariat in New York and 
assigning a senior ofﬁ  cial to participate in and draw other Bank staff into substantive preparations and in-
tergovernmental discussions as the process developed. After a time, IMF also assisted the FfD Secretariat, 
and WTO came to be involved as well. 
In fact, the agreement to allow “systemic” issues onto the FfD agenda could not have been other-
wise if the process was to have any credibility after the severe ﬁ  nancial crises of 1997-1998 in East Asia 
and the Russian Federation and the near meltdown of the market for US Treasury bills that followed soon 
after. The belief was widespread that the international ﬁ  nancial institutions had made important mistakes 
that worsened the situation in certain cases and, in any event, that the global ﬁ  nancial system had become 
quite fragile. “Financial architecture reform” had entered the international vocabulary. But which reforms, 
drafted by whom and with whose mandate? FfD could not ignore these issues. 
For the essential FfD outreach to the intergovernmental process in the BWIs, the Bureau was able 
to build on the activities of ECOSOC, which had held its second meeting with senior ofﬁ  cials of Govern-The Politics of Inclusion in the Monterrey Process  11
ments participating in the Bretton Woods ministerial committees in 1999, and a third meeting was held in 
2000. ECOSOC ambassadors also held meetings with the Boards of Executive Directors of both institu-
tions in Washington and New York in 1998 and 1999, although it had not been clear what purpose these 
meetings were supposed to serve. The new FfD PrepCom then offered a focused reason for Executive 
Board meetings with UN delegates, which took place in the FfD context in 2000 and 2001. FfD also made 
it to the agenda of the Development Committee at its November 2001 meeting, which had been postponed 
from its scheduled time because of 9/11. Coming a few months before the Monterrey Conference, this 
gave a boost to the importance of Monterrey, albeit on the back of a horrible tragedy. 
The series of meetings with the BWIs from 1998 on turned out to be an important interface 
between foreign and ﬁ  nance ministry representatives and over time helped build conﬁ  dence in the FfD 
process. However, in the beginning, there was considerable coolness to overcome. The Under-Secretary-
General for Economic and Social Affairs described them as being like “new neighbours talking awk-
wardly over the back fence”. Indeed, supporters of FfD welcomed the initiative of a very active NGO, the 
Quaker UN Ofﬁ  ce, to organize a weekend retreat in the Catskill Mountains in the summer of 2001 where 
a number of UN and Bretton Woods representatives could become more familiar with each other. 
In addition, country representatives to the New York and Washington institutions began to inter-
act, the most sustained being the “Philadelphia Group”, comprising about half a dozen developed coun-
try representatives to the World Bank and UN who have met regularly in Philadelphia, about half-way 
between Washington and New York. In other cases, it remained very hard to bridge the ministerial divide, 
other than on an ad hoc and unsustained basis. 
This notwithstanding, the FfD interactions with the intergovernmental machinery of the BWIs 
were far more successful than those with the WTO. Members of the FfD Bureau travelled to Geneva in 
2000 and met with members of the General Council, the senior WTO body, after which the Council ap-
pointed its Trade and Development Committee as interlocutor with the FfD process in New York. In 2001, 
the Bureau again visited the Committee on what was thought to be a genuine invitation to dialogue, but 
no real interchange with the New York delegates took place. The stated reason was that the Committee 
had not ﬁ  nished negotiating a text that it had wanted to submit to the FfD PrepCom giving the WTO view 
on a variety of trade-related matters. Whatever the reason, it sent a disappointing message on the distance 
the intergovernmental process of WTO seemed to wish to keep between itself and the UN in New York, at 
least at that time.11 
Besides outreach to international institutions, the PrepCom Bureau sought to engage the pri-
vate sector in FfD. In this case, emerging market ﬁ  nancial professionals from Wall Street began to show 
increasing interest in the UN as they looked around for ways in which to breathe new energy into interna-
tional lending and investing in developing countries, many of their main business activities in emerging 
economies having suffered heavily in the ﬁ  nancial crises. 
The pragmatic nature of the FfD process was attractive to business interests. FfD was not about 
making woolly statements on the social role of business, but addressed its fundamental economic proﬁ  t-
11  This aside, relations were largely cooperative and cordial during the FfD preparatory process, including with 
WTO staff working with the FfD staff in the preparation of reports to the PrepCom. Indeed, the Bureau began 
its disappointing day in Geneva with a useful dialogue about FfD with the Director-General and the Chair of the 
General Council.12  DESA Working Paper No. 23
making function. Governments in the FfD process wanted to hear from business about concrete ways to 
promote the ﬁ  nancing of development, which perforce is mainly private ﬁ  nancing. Developing countries 
explicitly sought to discuss how to bring more foreign business to their shores. 
Major business organizations, in particular, the International Chamber of Commerce and the 
World Economic Forum, thus became involved, and the Business Council for the United Nations in New 
York organized informal discussion groups of private ﬁ  nancial executives and specialists with UN diplo-
mats on techniques for ﬁ  nancing development. The engaged private sector people also became important 
advocates for FfD, especially with the US Government.
In Monterrey itself, business organizations held a pre-Conference International Business Fo-
rum on the ﬁ  rst day of the ofﬁ  cial Conference. A number of prominent ﬁ  nancial leaders from the South 
(primarily Latin America) and the North participated in the Forum and in “side events” during the Confer-
ence. After Monterrey, some of the private sector proposals tabled at those meetings would be implement-
ed independently or with support of certain donor Governments and foundations.
The FfD Bureau also reached out to civil society; indeed, it welcomed a large number of NGOs 
into FfD that did not already have standard consultative status with the UN through ECOSOC.12 Civil so-
ciety, as well as business organizations, thus became important participants in the FfD process and helped 
to shape the tone and content of the Consensus.13 
Admittedly, however, civil society advocacy groups ﬁ  rst had to overcome their initial dismissal 
of FfD as just another UN process that would produce nothing but an empty declaration. Ultimately, they 
came to argue effectively for important policy initiatives, as on how to handle the debt of poor countries in 
crisis. They also were important advocates in their national capitals for strong governmental participation 
in FfD and they advocated in Washington for serious engagement by the BWIs in the New York prepara-
tory meetings. 
They were also an important presence in the UN meetings themselves. They produced generally 
well-attended, provocative and technically competent public presentations in “hearings” and “side events” 
at the UN and made concerted efforts to inﬂ  uence key delegations through direct lobbying campaigns. In-
deed, being present in the PrepCom meetings, the NGOs could hear the views of different Governments, 
day by day, and respond to them. NGOs divided themselves up into caucus groups by topic, which would 
meet each morning before the ofﬁ  cial meetings began in order to discuss negotiating positions, target 
individual delegates to lobby and consider how to approach them. Also, NGOs, like the business repre-
sentatives, could take the ﬂ  oor at the end of each morning and afternoon PrepCom meeting, providing an 
opportunity to add their views to the debate. They were also able to circulate their position papers in the 
meeting room (Tennessee 2004: 17-19).14 
In Monterrey, NGOs, like their business counterparts, organized a pre-Conference Forum, running 
throughout the weekend before the ofﬁ  cial start, which several international organization staff, but few 
representatives of Governments, attended. However, NGOs more effectively reached deep into the Mon-
12  From the beginning, the FfD Secretariat also reached out through its Internet web page and list-serve broadsides, 
as well as by addressing various NGO audiences to inform them about the emerging process at the UN.
13  For more detail on NGO activities in FfD from 1998 to 2001, see Herman (2002: 172-175).
14  A detailed examination of NGO participation in the FfD process has been prepared as part of a Masters thesis by 
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terrey process through important “side events” during the Conference. Indeed, NGO-organized meetings 
during the January PrepCom in New York and in Monterrey were the ﬁ  rst public discussions involving 
IMF staff and ﬁ  nancial market professionals, let alone NGO debt campaigners, of the emerging IMF pro-
posal for a sovereign debt restructuring facility. In this regard, NGOs organized a number of meetings that 
Governments just found themselves having to cover.
Overall, civil society also played a political role in support of FfD in Europe and North America, 
and global NGOs were effective advocates during the preparatory meetings and in Monterrey (“effective” 
in that some of their concerns inﬂ  uenced the negotiations and a few proposals were even taken up, though 
not all their views were taken on board). Developing country individuals that were well plugged into the 
main international NGO networks participated in the FfD meetings in New York and Monterrey, as well as 
in “side events” during meetings of the BWIs in Washington on issues that were also part of FfD. Howev-
er, in developing economies themselves, civil society input on FfD—indeed, FfD itself—was less evident. 
Backsliding after the Conference
It was probably inevitable that after the Monterrey Conference ended there would be a redirection of 
attention to other issues and forums. Another big international meeting followed on its heels in Johan-
nesburg, South Africa in September, the World Summit on Sustainable Development, marking 10 years 
since the “Earth Summit” in Rio de Janeiro, the ﬁ  rst of the big UN global conferences of the 1990s. Other 
events would also require attention. Meanwhile, the Monterrey process seemed to begin to lose some of 
its momentum. The politics of inclusion was in danger of faltering.
The Monterrey Consensus had stipulated two bases on which a continuing important role for the 
FfD process could be predicated. One was recognition that the specialized international forums on trade 
and ﬁ  nancial issues were separate areas of activity and that the world could beneﬁ  t from a “coherence 
forum” where their impacts on each other and on development could be discussed. The other was that the 
UN had demonstrated in the FfD process that it could be that forum, having successfully brought together 
in Monterrey “all the relevant stakeholders” on international monetary, ﬁ  nancial, trade, and development 
policy. Thus, Governments pledged in the Consensus to “stay engaged” through the Monterrey process, 
not only to follow up on the commitments they had made, but also to bring the different international 
forums into regular contact with each other through the UN to strengthen international policy coherence.
The mechanism for the follow up was unlike that in other UN conferences. Instead of establishing 
a special forum, like the Commission on Sustainable Development for the follow up to the Earth Summit, 
FfD would make use of the existing main organs of the United Nations. First, the meetings of ECOSOC 
with the BWIs, that had by then become annual affairs, would be turned into FfD meetings to focus on 
“coherence, coordination and cooperation” on Monterrey issues. They would operate as in Monterrey, 
with a formal segment and with informal, multi-stakeholder dialogues. There would be no attempt to 
negotiate an agreed text on any of the discussions, but the President of ECOSOC would prepare a sum-
mary that could include recommendations under his or her own authority. The ﬁ  rst President under the 
new structure, the Ambassador of Guatemala, took this initiative, which was especially germane in this 
case because his summary was also to be a document of the ﬁ  rst FfD High-Level Dialogue in the General 
Assembly, described below.15 
15  In addition to the President’s summary of the ECOSOC meeting and his recommendations, summaries of the 
hearings and dialogue that were held a few weeks before with civil society and business were made documents of 
the Council and of the ensuing high-level dialogue (see UN 2003d).14  DESA Working Paper No. 23
WTO was invited to join the ECOSOC/FfD meeting at the intergovernmental level, which it did 
in 2003 in the person of one of its committee chairs, but this was not continued in 2004. Also, ECOSOC 
invited the Trade and Development Board of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) to join the discussions in 2004, which it did in the person of its Chair. However much UNC-
TAD was welcomed, especially by developing countries, WTO was felt to be the primary forum for inter-
national trade negotiations and its absence was signiﬁ  cant. Unfortunately, as may be recalled from what 
has been outlined above, WTO had been the one intergovernmental body to keep a signiﬁ  cant distance 
from FfD during the preparatory phase, and thus this policy was apparently simply resumed in 2004. 
Indeed, the WTO General Council hosted a meeting on policy coherence in trade and ﬁ  nancial matters in 
the spring of 2003 in which the IMF and World Bank heads participated, but at which the UN was only an 
observer. 
In fact, there is a history to the distancing of WTO from the UN that goes back to the Uruguay 
Round negotiations that led to the creation of WTO in 1995. The negotiators addressed the coherence is-
sue at that time but solely in the context of WTO-Bretton Woods interactions. WTO also had decided then 
not to afﬁ  liate formally with the UN as a “specialized agency”, which is the status of IMF and the World 
Bank. All of this underlined that ECOSOC was going to have a difﬁ  cult time engaging WTO at the inter-
governmental level (although WTO senior management has attended all major post-Monterrey meetings). 
The second part of the intergovernmental follow-up to Monterrey was agreement to hold a high-
level dialogue on FfD in the General Assembly every two years. The ﬁ  rst one was held in 2003 and it, like 
the ECOSOC meetings, brought a number of Government representatives with ministerial rank to New 
York. Although a small number of development cooperation and ﬁ  nance ministers participated, the meet-
ing was at a signiﬁ  cantly lower level than Monterrey had been. This too was expected, as Monterrey had 
been exceptional and this high-level dialogue would take place every two years. 
And yet, the dialogue was important. While it was structured somewhat like Monterrey and the 
ECOSOC meetings, in that it combined informal roundtables and a formal plenary, it had the potential for 
signiﬁ  cant consequences. In this case, the Second Committee pledged to consider adopting a resolution 
based on the dialogue after it ended.
Alas, that exercise was a great disappointment. The original concept was for the President of 
the Assembly, the Foreign Minister of Saint Lucia, to serve as facilitator for a draft resolution. The great 
prestige of his position was expected to help guide the negotiations, but in reality negotiations followed 
a more “classical” UN pattern. In fact, contending draft resolutions circulated and even the very skilled 
facilitator selected had great difﬁ  culty holding the pieces together, especially as the negotiations turned 
out to be contentious, even bitter at times, with no ambassadors or senior ofﬁ  cials stepping in to resolve 
disputes—as sometimes happens when important negotiations get bogged down. In the end, the agreed 
resolution pertained primarily to planning subsequent FfD meetings and activities. It was the last resolu-
tion to be adopted by the Second Committee in 2003 and required a delay in its closing. The plenary of 
the Assembly only adopted it on 23 December. 
Moreover, part of the agreement embodied in the FfD resolution was already in question by Janu-
ary 2004. Pursuant to that part, the President of ECOSOC, “in consultation with all major institutional 
stakeholders”, was expected to “focus the annual special [ECOSOC] high-level meeting on speciﬁ  c is-
sues, within the holistic integrated approach of the Monterrey Consensus” (General Assembly resolution The Politics of Inclusion in the Monterrey Process  15
58/230, para. 11(c)). In other words, the President was supposed to work with partners to reach an agreed 
focus of the meeting, including through consultations with management and the intergovernmental pro-
cesses of IMF, the World Bank, WTO and UNCTAD. As January turned into February and February into 
March, it became clear that there was no agreement on a focus and that the difﬁ  culty was internal to New 
York and did not have to do with the institutional partners. The result was that the 2004 ECOSOC discus-
sions “focused” on the following:
  The impact of private investment and trade-related issues on ﬁ  nancing for development;
  The role of multilateral institutions in reaching the Millennium Development Goals; 
 Debt  sustainability.
This was a very broad “focus” indeed, which almost guaranteed that the discussion would be at 
the level of generalities instead of an in-depth discussion of coherence aspects of any one of the topics 
alone. 
Post-Monterrey, but especially in 2004, the New York delegations have also challenged the 
continued enthusiasm of civil society and business partners in the FfD process. The coordinating groups 
for both sets of non-governmental partners planned with the UN Secretariat to organize “hearings” with 
delegations on the theme of the ECOSOC April 2004 meeting. These “hearings” had been an important 
part of the inclusiveness of the Monterrey process, although slackening attendance of delegates in the fall 
2003 hearings was a sign that something was amiss. The fact that there was no agreed focus to the coming 
ECOSOC meeting that the hearings were suppose to enrich made it difﬁ  cult to plan them, but both sets of 
partners in fact produced substantively rich meetings.
Unfortunately, very few of the delegates came to hear them. In the case of the NGO “hearings”, 
an effort was made to encourage attendance by setting up what was expected to be an active debate 
between NGOs and selected government representatives, to which delegates were expected to contribute 
from the ﬂ  oor. The overall theme was provocative enough: “coherence of the international ﬁ  nancial and 
trading systems in support of development: national responsibilities and international obligations”. The 
hearings were structured as a presentation by two NGO experts, followed by a critique and questions 
from two UN representatives. The United States, supporting this process, sent a Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of State as its commentator. The other commentators were the ambassadors of Jamaica, Pakistan 
and the European Commission (which speaks for the EU on trade matters). Very few representatives of 
other countries came into the room during the three hours of the hearings (most who did were from other 
European countries and a small number of developing country representatives who had been active in the 
FfD process in earlier years). 
The problem seemed to be that FfD was no longer on delegates’ “radar screens”. They had no 
engagement at this time with the substance of the hearings. That cogent and provocative analyses were 
being presented by NGO experts and challenged by senior diplomats in a collegial yet critical atmosphere 
was a lost opportunity for the country representatives who did not attend (it was a valuable use of time for 
the Secretariat staff and NGOs who did attend). 
Virtually the same reception was given to the business sector participants. If anything, there were 
even fewer government representatives in the room. The “business hearings” were structured differently, 
as the group of “business interlocutors” on FfD had organized a technical working group meeting the 
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day before and wanted to report to government representatives at the UN on the results of their discus-
sions. Some Governments had participated in the technical meeting, but from ﬁ  nance-related ministries or 
semi-independent ofﬁ  cial entities. A number of senior executives from the private sector and multilateral 
agencies drew from personal experience in discussing “critical information needs” and “risk-mitigation 
needs” of investors and in considering concrete mechanisms to help address them. The discussions were 
very rich. There was much to report to the UN representatives, but it fell on mainly empty chairs (again, 
Secretariat staff and NGOs learned from the presentations).
It appears, in other words, that the great efforts to institutionalize the strengths of FfD in the Mon-
terrey follow-up did not take hold. Perhaps more than was realized, talented diplomats and top manage-
ment of key institutions, plus momentum from business and civil society, along with a pressing political 
context accounted for the success of Monterrey. That combination would be hard to sustain. Many—but 
not all—of the diplomats who made up the core of interested parties in FfD have moved on to new post-
ings, as have some of the key ofﬁ  cials in the institutional partner organizations. Also, some of the issues 
from Monterrey have moved to the table for decision in Washington, as noted at the outset. Meanwhile, 
old methods of working on economic issues in the UN continued alongside the new FfD processes and, 
with the weakening of the momentum of Monterrey, the old ways appear to have captured FfD as well. 
FfD in the year of the World Summit
These difﬁ  culties continued in evidence in 2005, although they were partly hidden by the activities associ-
ated with the UN World Summit in September which marked ﬁ  ve years since the Millennium Summit that 
had launched the Millennium Declaration and its associated goals. Very many Governments accorded high 
priority to both the original Summit and the coming “plus 5”. The Summits took the economic and social 
sides of the UN seriously, but they were broader in scope, and as 2005 progressed, it became clear that the 
future of the UN itself was going to be a major topic of the meeting. FfD was overwhelmed.
Discussions in the ECOSOC meeting in April and the FfD high-level dialogue in June were again 
at an extremely general level. It was as though both meetings had to be held owing to earlier commit-
ments, while most delegations seemed primarily concerned about preparations for the Summit. Perhaps 
the FfD meetings could have been used as opportunities to help develop policy proposals for the Summit, 
but they were scheduled too close to the Summit itself to allow for this, and such an approach was proba-
bly also precluded by the very different scope of the two efforts. FfD’s span of domestic and international 
economic policies and efforts to engage ﬁ  nance and trade ministries, as well as foreign affairs specialists, 
only overlapped in small part with the sweep of UN-oriented political, social and economic measures that 
were the Summit’s main concern.
Indeed, there was tension through 2005 between the two processes. It had been a working as-
sumption since 2002 that each of the high-level dialogues would be held during the regular session of the 
General Assembly, which is to say, September to December. The 2005 Dialogue was instead scheduled in 
June so as not to divert attention from the Summit, albeit with the compromise of devoting half of one day 
of the Summit to FfD, which time was ﬁ  lled with a sequence of set speeches. Financial policy announce-
ments, when they were made, related mostly to issues also on the Summit agenda, in particular develop-
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In this regard, the Summit served as the Monterrey Conference had in 2002, as a moment for 
Governments to respond to growing international expectations, in this case to announce new funding 
commitments to reach the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). As had also happened in 2002, the 
main aid initiatives were developed outside the UN in donor forums. They were discussed in the FfD 
meetings as they were announced and developed, and they were taken to the Summit for formal unveiling. 
These included, in addition to the commitments to increase national aid ﬂ  ows, as noted earlier, a decision 
by the Group of 8 to press in the Bretton Woods institutions and the African Development Bank for the 
cancellation of almost 100 per cent of the debts owed those institutions by qualifying low-income coun-
tries. Moreover, a group of countries from North and South agreed to adopt innovative measures to raise 
additional ﬁ  nancial resources for development, in the ﬁ  rst instance through a tax on air passenger travel 
in their countries. A further initiative aimed at “front loading” assistance, in particular, for immunizations 
in developing countries as a pilot project, by borrowing funds on ﬁ  nancial markets to be serviced out of 
future aid budgets. Coupled with a continuing focus on steps to raise the efﬁ  ciency and effectiveness of 
ODA, these measures spoke to the crucial need to actually attain the MDGs. 
Notwithstanding these advances, which related to one chapter of the Monterrey Consensus, FfD 
has always insisted on a perspective that is broader than development assistance, just as development is 
broader than the MDGs. It would be hard to identify areas in which the international community made 
large advances in any of those other policy areas or in their interrelationships in 2005.
On a different level, outside the arena of intergovernmental discussion, the FfD process facilitated 
important substantive work on several policy issues in 2005. That work took the form of multistakeholder 
consultations organized by the UN (FfD Ofﬁ  ce), by the private sector (World Economic Forum) and by 
civil society (New Rules for Global Finance Coalition).16 Each of these efforts entailed a series of meet-
ings in different parts of the world to bring together relevant “stakeholders” to consider concrete policy 
concerns that ranged from access to ﬁ  nancial services by poor people in developing countries to reform of 
the global ﬁ  nancial architecture. They dealt with private investment and experiences with public/private 
partnerships in the provision of clean water, health and education. They also considered ways of manag-
ing sovereign debt for sustained development and working out from debt crises. Many ideas and propos-
als emerged from these discussions, which included practitioners from the private and public sectors, 
academics and ofﬁ  cials from national and multilateral policy-making institutions. These discussions have 
been a welcome addition to the FfD process (cf. General Assembly resolution 60/188, para. 10, which 
called for their continuation).
Conclusion: Lessons for continued dialogue
The Monterrey process can be reinvigorated. Whether or not that happens depends on whether the factors 
that accounted for its success come to operate adequately once again.
The ﬁ  rst factor is leadership from among the country representatives to the UN. Unlike the BWIs, 
General Assembly initiatives in the economic and social area are typically led by country missions and not 
by the Secretariat. The Assembly processes allow capable and articulate leaders even from small countries 
to take initiatives and build coalitions around issues. FfD began as the initiative of a representative of a 
middle-sized, middle-income country. It spread ﬁ  rst to enough of the members of the group of develop-
16  For a concise report on these activities see UN (2005). Reports of each of the consultations and related materials 
may be found on the FfD website at www.un.org/esa/ffd.18  DESA Working Paper No. 23
ing countries to win the G-77 endorsement and then garnered support of certain important developed and 
other relatively advanced countries. Participants in the coalition may have been seeking disparate ends, 
but one aspect of effective leadership in a parliamentary context like the General Assembly is that of help-
ing them all see FfD as a promising path to their ends. 
The second factor is that there be sufﬁ  cient ﬂ  exibility—even ambiguity—in the process and its 
goals so as to allow the leaders to hold the interested parties together. The explicit strategy in the FfD 
process to prevent the tabling of G-77 texts for negotiation used the fog from not tabling national posi-
tions to prevent defections from the supporting coalition of Governments from North and South. Positions 
of Governments that are written down for consideration by other countries, ipso facto, become matters 
for change through negotiation. It is best to leave this to the ﬁ  nal stages of the process, when the starting 
positions will have come closer together. In addition, beginning that ﬁ  nal negotiation with a “facilitator’s 
text” relieves Governments of having to explicitly state and defend their national positions except insofar 
as is necessary in making comments on such a text. Moreover, participation of other multilateral insti-
tutions was contingent on not being trapped into negotiation over matters usually decided in their own 
intergovernmental forums. Premature speciﬁ  city, especially through written texts, not only might have 
forced the institutions to withdraw, but it could have led their major shareholders to gut the entire prospect 
of potential positive results.17
The third factor is that a core group of ofﬁ  cials needs to become committed to the project and 
ﬁ  ght for it, as it will have to overcome both active adversaries and the studied indifference of needed 
partners. In the case of FfD, a major challenge was to involve ﬁ  nance ministries and in some cases central 
banks in a UN exercise. As noted earlier, foreign ministries are responsible for country representation at 
the UN and while they have often engaged less powerful ministries in UN affairs (social, environmental, 
health, etc.), for FfD they had to engage the generally more powerful ﬁ  nance ministries. The core country 
representatives at the UN led in this effort in the FfD process. The core included, besides a number of 
government representatives, individuals in the staffs of the Secretariat and the BWIs, and important indi-
viduals in senior management of those institutions. Each helped to bridge the ministerial divide; without 
this the project would have failed. Some of those links have atrophied and need to be strengthened for a 
successful FfD future. 
The fourth factor is the ability to maintain both the leadership and the core support group over 
time. While senior management of the UN and other institutions may turn over each decade and while 
staff members are usually on a long-run career path (albeit often with changing assignments), diplo-
mats and governmental representatives in the UN and the ﬁ  nancial and trade institutions usually change 
postings every 3 to 5 years. The core is thus bound to lose important individuals, and it needs to be big 
enough and have enough overlapping tenures to survive the departure of key individuals. In the case of 
FfD, core members from the UN missions were not necessarily elected into formal leadership positions in 
the intergovernmental structures. The core was informal and mainly discussed what should happen in the 
formal structures. Indeed, in order to better focus and sustain the core, the Secretary-General has repeat-
17  The range from ambiguity to speciﬁ  city can be relevant at any level of an international discussion process, but 
it does not solve all problems. For example, the inability to agree before March 2004 on substantive areas of 
focus for the April 2004 ECOSOC meeting, as discussed in the text above, did not reﬂ  ect a premature move to 
speciﬁ  city. Whatever the topics selected, they could be expressed with more or less precision, which the wording 
in the topics actually chosen as cited above showed. The delay seemed rather to be about a lack of willingness on 
the part of some countries to enter into any discussion beyond the most inconsequential at that time in the FfD 
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edly recommended that an intergovernmental “FfD Committee” be set up, but the recommendation has 
gone unheeded.
The ﬁ  fth factor is that non-ofﬁ  cial stakeholders be engaged in the process in a serious way. The 
FfD PrepCom facilitated this by establishing easy rules for engagement in ofﬁ  cial meetings by individual 
NGOs and business executives, and by offering many opportunities for interaction. The non-ofﬁ  cial actors 
have come to believe that their views are being considered as part of the work programme of the process, 
i.e., that it is worth their time and effort. In the case of FfD, both business and NGO groups also advocat-
ed in relevant ministries for their Governments to participate seriously and at a senior level. Keeping this 
ﬂ  ame alive (or rekindling it) is a major challenge today in the FfD process.
The ﬁ  nal factor is that real-world developments should bolster the political value of effective 
international cooperation. FfD was born in the midst of the Asian ﬁ  nancial crisis and “Afro-pessimism”, 
and then the Millennium Declaration announced a new international commitment to development coop-
eration for global peace and security, as well as human solidarity over development. On top of this, a new 
level of urgency suddenly emerged after “9/11”, when the feeling spread that a world forever divided into 
rich and poor was no longer feasible politically, let alone desirable. But there also needed to be a sense 
that multilateral processes could address the root causes of the security threats, or that it was at least worth 
gambling that multilateralism held the answer. The ﬁ  nal factor, then, pertains to leadership at the most 
senior levels of Governments about the most fundamental aspects of international relations.
In sum, the main challenge facing those wishing to nurture the politics of inclusion in the Monter-
rey process is how to continue to engage the large and small countries of the world, the main international 
institutions and the non-ofﬁ  cial stakeholders. If anything, the 2005 World Summit and its Outcome docu-
ment underline the necessity to realize the commitment to make the international system—and the UN at 
its centre—work effectively, efﬁ  ciently and fairly. In the case of FfD, it is not a matter of better “enfran-
chising” developing countries and civil society in international processes that are otherwise dominated 
by the most powerful countries. That may be the political challenge in other international processes. FfD 
began as a developing country initiative among foreign affairs ministries represented at the UN. The chal-
lenge all along has been to engage ﬁ  rst the foreign ministries of the North with the South, and then the 
ﬁ  nance ministries of the North and South, the relevant multilateral institutions and the non-ofﬁ  cial actors. 
This remains the challenge today.20  DESA Working Paper No. 23
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